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and challenges1
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ABSTRACT. The term «third-generation therapies» refers to a series of therapies that
emerge in the 1990s within the tradition of behavioral therapy. The aim of this article
is to review their achievements and challenges. The method involves analyzing recent
formulations of these therapies so as to identify their distinctive characteristics and the
clinical innovations they represent. As regards their characteristics, it is important to
acknowledge the fact that they give back to behavioral therapy its contextual perspective,
lost with the advent of cognitive-behavioral therapy, which would now be classed as
«second-generation.» This is why they are also called contextual therapies. The two
main clinical innovations of these therapies are, on the one hand, psychological inflexibility
as a psychopathological model common to various disorders, and on the other, the
identification of therapeutic principles, more than specific techniques, in relation to
processes of experiential acceptance and behavioral change. Notable among the challenges
are those deriving from the very success of these therapies, which have taken on the
character of a fashion, without the assumption of the philosophy they entail.
KEYWORDS. ACT. Behavioral activation. Psychological inflexibility. Medical model.
Contextual model. Schizophrenia. Theoretical study.
RESUMEN. Las terapias de tercera generación refieren una serie de terapias que surgen
en la década de los años noventa en la tradición de la terapia de conducta. El objetivo
de este artículo es revisar sus logros y retos. El método consiste en analizar las
formulaciones recientes de estas terapias en orden a identificar sus características
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distintivas y las innovaciones clínicas que representan. Respecto a sus características
distintivas, importa reconocer el hecho de que la terapia conductual recupera la pers-
pectiva contextual perdida con la terapia cognitivo-conductual, que quedaría ahora como
«segunda generación». Es por lo que estas terapias también se denominan terapias
contextuales. En cuanto a las innovaciones clínicas, importan sobre todo las que se
refieran a la conceptualización psicopatológica y los principios terapéuticos. La inno-
vación clínica cuenta con dos grandes aportaciones: la inflexibilidad psicológica como
modelo psicopatológico común a diversos trastornos, y la identificación de principios
terapéuticos, más que técnicas específicas, en torno a procesos de aceptación experiencial
y de cambio conductual. Entre los retos se destacan los derivados del propio éxito de
estas terapias, que queden como una moda, sin asumir la filosofía que implican.
PALABRAS CLAVE. ACT. Activación conductual. Inflexibilidad psicológica. Modelo
médico. Modelo contextual. Esquizofrenia. Estudio teórico.
The term «third-generation behavior therapies» is a designation, but also a slogan,
coined by Steven Hayes, the author of one such therapy, in an article from 2004 (Hayes,
2004). As a designation, it refers to a series of therapies that emerge in the 1990s and
establish themselves as a new generation in the first ten years of the new century. This
movement is called «clinical behavior analysis» because it represents a move away from
cognitivism and back toward radical behaviorism and other forms of behaviorism, in
particular functional analysis and behavioral models of verbal behavior (Dougher, 2011).
As a slogan it is audacious, in that it highlights the novelty of these therapies with
respect to the established ones, but it is also risky, insofar as others will follow it,
ushering in the «fourth generation», the «ultimate» therapies or the «new wave.» In
Spain, where they were introduced in 1996 in a book (Pérez-Álvarez, 1996), they were
well accepted and soon built upon, thanks above all to the work of Luciano (Luciano
and Hayes, 2001; Wilson and Luciano, 2002) and of others, including Barraca (2009,
2012), García-Montes and Pérez-Álvarez (2001, 2005, 2010), García Palacios (2006),
Kohlenberg et al. (2005), Martín-Murcia, Cangas-Díaz, and Pardo-Gonzalez (2011), Pérez-
Álvarez (2006, 2007) and Valero-Aguayo, Kohlenberg, Ferro-García, and Tsai, (2011).
These new therapies include: Acceptance and Commitment Therapy (ACT; Hayes,
Strosahl, and Wilson, 1999), Functional Analytic Psychotherapy (FAP; Kohlenberg and
Tsai, 1991), Dialectical Behavioral Therapy (DBT; Linehan, 1993), Behavioral Activation
(BA; Jacobson, Martell, and Dimidjian, 2001), Integrative Behavioral Couples Therapy
(IBCT; Jacobson, Christensen, Prince, Cordova, and Eldridge, 2000), and Mindfulness-
Based Therapy (MBT; Segal, Williams, and Teasdale, 2002).
Acceptance and Commitment Therapy (ACT), developed by Steven Hayes, is
probably the most widely studied of all the third-generation behavior therapy models
(Hayes et al., 1999). It is based on Relational Frame Theory (RFT), a psychological
theory of human language and cognition, extensively developed by Hayes himself and
Dermot Barnes-Holmes (Hayes, Barnes-Holmes, and Roche, 2001). With a philosophical
basis in functional contextualism, RFT explores how humans learn language in social
interactions. Functional contextualism studies experimentally the learning of psychological
events such as feelings, thoughts and behaviors, resituating them in the context of their
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interpersonal functions. Functional contextualism is in fact an extension of B. F. Skinner’s
radical behaviorism, which addresses the question of the emergence of complex linguistic
and cognitive abilities and competencies from precursory, more basic learning processes.
Both RFT and ACT are supported by growing bodies of empirical evidence (Barnes-
Holmes, 2005; Ruiz, 2010), as well as a variety of extensions, including substance abuse
(Luciano, Páez-Blarrina, and Valdivia-Salas, 2010) and chess improvement (Ruíz and
Luciano, 2009).
Functional Analytic Psychotherapy (FAP) was developed by Robert Kohlenberg
and Mavis Tsai based on behavior analysis, and is a functional contextualist approach
which also follows in the wake of Skinner’s radical behaviorism (Kohlenberg and Tsai,
1991). FAP focuses on client-therapist interactions in session, about which it has
developed a functional analysis and classification of clinically relevant behaviors. FAP
assumes, creating the conditions for it, that the therapeutic session can become an
interpersonal context functionally equivalent to situations of the client’s real environmental
outside of therapy. The clinical relationship would be the condition and the natural
context for therapeutic change, and this often involves the establishment of intense
therapeutic relationships. FAP is an example of the translation of theory and research
into practice (Weeks, Kanter, Bonow, Landes, and Busch, 2012).
Dialectical Behavioral Therapy (DBT) was developed by Marsha Linehan specifically
for multiple personality disorder (Linehan, 1993), but is also applied to other disorders.
This therapy sets out to combine acceptance and change in dialectic fashion. Acceptance
in DBT places particular emphasis on the validation by the therapist of the client’s
experiences and behaviors, characterized in borderline personality disorder by a marked
emotional dysregulation. Therapy is offered as a context of acceptance and validation
in which to develop skills for changing emotional regulation. While on the one hand
feelings are valid and we must accept them, it is also true that being dependent upon
them can be harmful to oneself and others, especially considering the possibility that
they can be changed. The application of DBT includes individual and group modalities,
as well as crisis hotlines and the possibility of crisis intervention. This kind of therapy
is well established in the treatment of borderline personality disorder (Soler et al., 2012).
Behavioral Activation (BA) emerged from the analysis of ingredients of cognitive
depression therapy, after it was shown that the behavioral activation component alone
was as effective as the complete therapy (Jacobson et al., 1996). This component by
itself, reworked in accordance with behavioral principles, gave rise to behavioral activation
therapy, which has shown in major depression to be more effective than cognitive
therapy and more advantageous than medication (Dimidjian et al., 2006; Pérez-Álvarez,
2007). There are two application protocols, scarcely distinguishable in their names:
«behavioral activation», which emphasizes functional analysis, and «behavioral activation
therapy,» which stresses the «matching law», regarding the relative value of reinforcers
depending on the reinforcers of the alternative behavior (Barraca, 2009). Scales for the
assessment of depression have been developed in line with this conception (Barraca,
Pérez-Álvarez, Bleda, and Lozano Bleda, 2011).
Integrative Behavioral Couples Therapy (IBCT) was also developed, like behavioral
activation, by Neil Jacobson, borne out of his dissatisfaction with traditional behavioral
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couples therapy. Its roots are in the Skinnerian distinction between contingency-shaped
and rule-governed behavior. The latest version of its original formulation follows the
lines of acceptance and change that characterize third-generation therapies (Christensen
and Jacobson, 1998; Jacobson et al., 2000).
Mindfulness-Based Therapy (MBT) is a therapeutic approach, derived from Buddhism,
that involves focusing one’s attention on the experience of the moment, including
feelings, thoughts, bodily states and other private events, as well as on the environment,
without judging or analyzing them, but instead adopting an attitude of openness,
curiosity and acceptance (Bishop et al., 2004). The philosophy and techniques based
on mindfulness have shown their efficacy in depression and anxiety (Hofmann, Sawyer,
Witt, and Oh, 2010) as well as demonstrating a range of healthy psychological effects
(Keng, Smoski, and Robins, 2011). Mindfulness has been integrated into ACT, FAP, and
DBT.
This aim of this theoretical study is to review their achievements and challenges.
Notable among the achievements of these therapies are the distinctive characteristics
for which they are also called contextual therapies. Likewise, it is important to highlight
the clinical innovations they represent, particularly with regard to the psychopathological
conception and therapeutic procedure. As far as the challenges are concerned, it is
important to acknowledge those deriving from the very success of these therapies, and
especially from their drift in the direction of mindfulness, whose connotations of snobbery
may work to the detriment of their establishing affinities with the Western philosophical
tradition. Another challenge to consider concerns the role of these therapies in
schizophrenia, the touchstone of any psychological therapy worthy of the name. The
challenge here is for them to avoid remaining as mere adjuncts to medication, representing
as they do a contextual model alternative to the medical model. The method to be
followed involves analyzing recent formulations of the most representative therapies (so
as to identify their characteristics and innovations) and contrasting them with typical
current models. This work being of an interpretive nature (Fernández-Ríos and Buela-
Casal, 2009), its results, discussion and conclusions are presented following the
argumentation, and using formats which make for easier reading, including summary
boxes (Hartley, 2012). The exposition is confined to dealing with the objectives set.
Achievements: Contextual perspective and clinical innovation
Contextual perspective: Meanings of context
The words «context» and «contextual» are among the most amenable in Psychology.
It is hard to find any theory or procedure that does not consider itself as contextual.
However, self-definitions apart, it is possible to distinguish clinical approaches that are
actually contextual from others which are not, or only barely so. Moreover, the meaning
of context in therapy is not univocal. As regards third-generation therapies, their contextual
character has three senses or dimensions: environment, therapeutic relationship and
person.
The context of environment refers to the medium in which people’s lives unfold.
It denotes a social and cultural setting that includes the various areas of everyday life
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(family, social relations, education, work, leisure, etc.), with its norms and values. In this
line, the context is roughly equivalent to the «lebenswelt» of phenomenology or the
«circumstances» of Ortega and Gasset’s philosophy (Pérez-Álvarez and Sass, 2008). Of
the therapies described above, IBCT and BA are those which most «exploit» this
dimension: the first as a therapy for a problem that is actually interpersonal, and the
second as a therapy consisting in activating the person so as to modify the environmental
conditions that can change their depressive state.
The context of the therapeutic relationship refers to the context provided by the
psychotherapy itself, as a place and time in which to have experiences that could be
corrective, and thus learn new ways of understanding and changing the problems that
occur. The approach and conceptual framework of the therapy, in which the problem is
explained, interpreted and reappraised, form an important part of the therapeutic relationship
context. Of the mentioned therapies, FAP and DBT are those that most «exploit» this
dimension. Both bring the therapeutic relationship into play as a relationship that is
itself therapeutic. The consideration of therapy as an experiential and learning context
is in line with psychoanalytically inspired psychotherapies that stress the curative role
of the corrective emotional experience.
The context relative to the person refers to persons themselves as social-verbal
individuals, incorporating an entire past and characterized by a coping style. Needless
to say, the person is in a dialectical relationship with the world, in the sense of Ortega’s
«I am myself and my circumstances» (Pérez-Álvarez and Sass, 2008). The context of the
person consists of the explanations, appraisals and ways of understanding psychological
problems that prevail in the society of reference and that one has learned and considers
as natural. Of the above therapies, ACT and MBT are those that most «exploit» this
dimension. In its own way, each tries to change the person’s relationship with their own
symptoms (experiences, feelings, thoughts, obsessions, voices, etc.).
It need hardly be pointed out that the three contexts (environment, therapeutic
relationship, person) are not only mutually exclusive, but also mutually reinforcing. The
fact that some therapies «exploit» one context more than another does not mean they
are not assuming and considering the others. Thus, the therapeutic relationship is
fundamental to any therapy worth its salt, including those that emphasize the environmental
dimension, such as, BA. Without a good therapeutic relationship it would be difficult
to «activate» someone who is very depressed. Meanwhile, environmental change is
expected to derive from the new experiences, actions and reactions learned in a therapeutic
relationship such as that provided by FAP or DBT. Likewise, possible change in one’s
relationship with one’s own private events depends on a good therapeutic relationship
– like the one required for the client to do something that probably goes against
common sense, such as «accepting» the symptoms he or she wishes to «eliminate».
Changing the relationship with one’s own experiences also depends on the environment
(e.g., family and other clinical professionals) accepting the symptoms without the usual
interference and stigmatization. In turn, therapies that emphasize the therapeutic relationship
and environmental change also assume that the way the client experiences the symptoms
will change. Table 1 presents the therapies according to their affinity with aspects of
the context indicated.
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TABLE 1. Affinity between the aspects of context and the different therapies.
The contextual perspective: Medical model vs contextual model
The contextual perspective of third-generation therapies offers an alternative to the
internalist perspective adopted by second-generation therapies, namely cognitive or
cognitive-behavioral therapy, which had undermined the contextual (environmental)
nature of first-generation behavioral therapy.
An internalist perspective corresponds to a medical model of illness, even when
its terms are psychological. Its emphasis on deficits or dysfunctions of supposed
internal mechanisms (neural, cognitive or neurocognitive) ends up de-contextualizing
the problem in question. Likewise, an internalist approach tends to consider psychological
techniques as specific to the presumed dysfunction they are trying to remedy (in the
same way as drugs), even if it is difficult to find evidence that psychotherapeutic
techniques function beyond the context of the therapy, including its conceptual framework
and the interpersonal relationship it involves. Indeed, the great debate in psychotherapy
is between the medical model of psychotherapy and the contextual model of psychotherapy
(Wampold, 2001). The most significant representative of the medical model today is
probably cognitive therapy or cognitive-behavioural therapy (both second-generation
therapies).
The medical model of psychological therapy can be characterized, analagously with
the medical-psychiatric, psychopharmacological model, according to four dimensions,
referring to explanation, causal mechanism, treatment and efficacy criteria.
The medical model of psychological therapy proposes an internal psychological
explanation of mental disorders. Where the medical-psychiatric model offers a
neurobiological explanation, the medical-psychological model (e.g., cognitive therapy)
offers a psychological explanation, usually in terms of information processing. In spite
of the different terms, on the one hand neurobiological and on the other psychological,
the two models maintain the same internalist perspective.
The medical model of psychological therapy assumes a dysfunction or deficit in
psychological functioning, typically a cognitive schema (e.g., a depressogenic schema),
as causal mechanism. Where the medical-psychiatric model assumes a neurobiological
malfunction, typically a neurochemical imbalance or a defective circuit, the medical-
psychological model (particularly cognitive therapy) assumes a dysfunction, deficit or
defect in cognitive processing. Both models adopt a mechanistic view of disorders.
The medical model of psychological therapy applies specific techniques for each
disorder, supposedly aimed at repairing or restructuring the underlying dysfunction.
Where the medical-psychiatric model offers medication indicated for each disorder, the
Aspect of context More affinity therapies 
The environment as interpersonal 
social context 
 
The therapeutic relationship as 
experiential learning context 
Integrative Behavioral Couples Therapy 
Behavioral Activation 
 
Functional Analytic Psychotherapy  
Dialectical Behavioral Therapy 
 
 
The person as social verbal context 
 
Acceptance and Commitment Therapy  
Mindfulness-Based Therapy  
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medical-psychological model (cognitive therapy) offers a specific technique, typically
involving cognitive restructuring for the underlying schemas, beliefs or cognitions
(depression schema, panic schema, etc.). The point is that there are no actual specific
treatments, either psychopharmacological or psychological. Thus, for example, the
psychoactive drugs that are good for one disorder also work well for other conditions,
other than that for which they were designed and marketed. Expressions such as
«antidepressant» or «antipsychotic» reflect commercial motives, not supposed etiologically
specific psychopharmacological actions. For their part, psychological treatments are not
specific in this etiological sense either. Proof of this is that relatively different treatments
have quite similar efficacy (without going so far as to say that any procedure works for
any problem). Moreover, there is no psychological technique, however specific for a
given problem, that can function outside the context of the therapeutic relationship. The
efficacy of psychological techniques is dependent on the context of the therapy:
therapeutic relationship, explanation of the problem, etc. (Wampold, 2001).
For the medical model of psychological therapy, the criterion of efficacy is the
reduction of the symptoms that define a clinical condition. And if the medical-psychiatric
model uses a list of symptoms (treatable with medication), the medical-psychological
model (cognitive therapy) in fact uses practically the same questionnaire. Even though
this has permitted cognitive therapy to measure and show its effectiveness with respect
to medication (a great achievement that should be acknowledged), the fact is that this
success has been at the cost of mimicking the medical model. More is expected of
psychological therapies than merely matching and competing with medication. A clinical
approach that measures its efficacy through the reduction of symptoms will find it hard
to entertain the possibility that a patient has improved or even overcome the problem
if he or she is «symptomatic.» However, it may be the case that a person continues to
have symptoms that appear on a list but they are no longer a problem that disrupts his
or her life.
In relation to these dimensions, a contextual model of psychological therapy would
be characterized as follows. The contextual model of psychological therapy explains the
disorder in interactive, functional and contextual terms, and not as something that is
defective inside the individual – in the brain or in the mind – or necessarily outside –
in the society or the culture – but rather in the co-evolutionary history of the person
and their circumstances. The disorder or problem would not be within the person; rather,
so to speak, the person would be within a certain set of circumstances or problematic
situation. For example, depression would not be something one has within oneself, but
a situation in which one is (Martell, Addis, and Jacobson, 2001; Pérez-Álvarez, 2007).
The contextual model of psychological therapy assumes that the problem has to
do with the individual in their dealings with others and with themselves – with their own
experiences, feelings, thoughts and other «private events». It does not assume that
there must be some defect, deficit or dysfunction in some hypothetical psychological
mechanism from which to understand the problem, as the underlying cause. On the
contrary, it is understood that psychological disorders are possibilities of life, due more
to the human condition than to the natural condition. They are said to be human
«possibilities» not because of the truism that if they exist it is because they are
possible, but rather because of the consideration (anthropological and philosophical)
of humans as having an open nature, insofar as they are capable of «being» in various
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ways, including those that may become problematic. Nor are these possibilities necessarily
abnormal – in the sense of failure to comply with a norm – since, even though they may
be problematic or pathological, they deploy new norms and ways of being (Canguilhem,
1966/1971). Indeed, mental disorders cannot be defined on the basis of a supposed
normal natural design (cerebral or mental), with respect to which they would be a defect
or malfunction, given the essentially interactive and historical-cultural nature of
psychological problems (Pérez-Álvarez, 2008, 2012b).
The contextual model of psychological therapy, rather than specific techniques,
provides general therapeutic principles, an aspect we shall discuss later on. The contextual
model superannuates the role of the patient as passive, mechanistic, a processor of
information, and ushers in the role of the active client, a responsible person, with a
capacity for response (ability) and to take responsibility for his or her actions. Very
often the solution to a psychological problem requires the client to make decisions
about what to do with his or her life.
The contextual model of psychological therapy measures its efficacy more by
personal achievements in the direction of the values in the different domains selected
than by the reduction of symptoms from a list. A possible improvement might consist
in doing something worthwhile, in spite of the symptoms that may persist, such as
sadness or voices. Even so, it is not a case of always having to do something while
bearing the burden of suffering, but rather of managing to change the context in which
the suffering occurs, both the social-interpersonal context by improving the environmental
conditions, and one’s social-verbal context with respect to oneself through self-distancing.
Table 2 compares the medical model – psychiatric and psychological – with the contextual
model in accordance with the terms used.
TABLE 2. Comparison between medical model, -psychiatric and psychological-
and contextual model.
 
Medical Model Contextual Model  
 Psychiatric 
(Psychopharmacological) 
Psychological  
(cognitive therapy) 
Psychological  
(third generation behavior 
therapy) 
Explanation Neurobiological explanation 
(brain structures, 
neurochemical mechanisms) 
Intrapsychic psychological 
explanation (cognitive 
structures and processes) 
Interactive psychological 
explanation (functional and 
contextual) 
Causal 
mechanism 
"Internal failure" 
 Neurochemical imbalances, 
faulty circuits 
"Internal failure" 
Cognitive dysfunction 
(e.g., depressogenic 
schema) 
No mechanism 
Possible human condition 
Treatment Medication (antidepressant, 
antipsychotic) 
Specific techniques 
(cognitive therapy for 
depression, panic, etc.) 
General principles: 
Acceptance and activation 
Efficacy criterion Reduction of symptoms Reduction of symptoms Positive achievements 
(personal horizons 
expanded) 
Clinical innovation: Psychological inflexibility as a model of psychopathology
Third-generation therapies represent a clinical innovation, with regard to both
psychopathological conceptualization and the therapeutic procedure. Such innovations
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should be considered as not only of interest within their own tradition, but as important
and relevant for all clinical conceptions, be they psychological or psychiatric. As
regards the psychopathological concept, third-generation therapies offer a functional-
contextual, transdiagnostic alternative to the established classification systems. The
alternative offered by these therapies is radically different from the much-maligned but
persistent system of diagnostic categories (the DSM-IV containing more categories than
the DSM-III, and presumably fewer than the forthcoming version V). Their radical nature
consists in identifying the common processes that are at the root of the different
disorders and proposing a unified concept of the psychopathological condition.
This concept is offered by ACT, as the third-generation therapy that has most
extensively developed its proposals theoretically and empirically. This psychological
process and the concept to which it gave rise was initially introduced in 1996 as
experiential avoidance (Hayes, Wilson, Gifford, Follette, and Strosahl, 1996; Luciano and
Hayes, 2001). In subsequent reworkings, experiential avoidance became just one processes,
which together with others made up the broader concept of psychological inflexibility
(Hayes, Levin, Plumb-Vilardaga, Villatte, and Pistorello, 2011; Hayes, Luoma, Bond,
Masuda, and Lillis, 2006). Psychological inflexibility, as a functional dimension common
to the etiology and maintenance of various disorders, is in line with other proposals for
transdiagnostic approaches with an emphasis on self-focused attention (Harvey, Watkins,
Mansell, and Shafran, 2008; Ingram, 1990) and on hyperreflexivity, as an even more
inclusive concept (Pérez-Álvarez, 2008, 2012b).
Psychological inflexibility can be understood as an intensified entanglement in
one’s own experiences, emotions and thoughts, impeding contact with reality and one’s
involvement in matters of value for one’s life. More specifically, psychological inflexibility
refers to a series of processes (actions, reactions and experiences) that involve a
narrowing of the behavioral repertoire. These processes are the following six (Hayes et
al., 2006, 2011): cognitive fusion, experiential avoidance, loss of flexible contact with the
present, attachment to a conceptualized self, values problems, and inaction, impulsivity,
or avoidant persistence.
Cognitive fusion is characterized by taking thoughts literally, as though they were
already facts to which to respond. Cognitive-verbal processes dominate behavioral
regulation to the virtual exclusion of other sources of control, such as the contingencies
actually present. There is excessive trust in the rules and, on the other hand, insensitivity
to contingencies. One is «fused» with what one thinks and says to oneself, to the
detriment of considering how things really are. Rather than questioning the rationality
of the thoughts, as cognitive therapy would do, ACT sets out to make contact with the
processes under way, neither analyzing nor judging them, as though saying that thoughts
are nothing more than «thoughts».
Experiential avoidance is the tendency to avoid or escape from aversive private
events such as thoughts, emotions, memories and bodily sensations, even if this
prejudices one’s behavior (leading to more of the same). The relational nature of human
cognition and language makes it possible to categorize, evaluate and try to avoid the
emotional responses themselves, whose avoidance negatively reinforces their intensity
and persistence, thus severely restricting behavioral flexibility and effectiveness. The
alternative to avoidance is acceptance, understood as an open, responsive and flexible
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attitude with respect to the experience of the moment. Acceptance is not resignation or
passive resistance, but rather positive action that changes the function of experiences
of events to be avoided, in favor of a focus of interest and curiosity as a part of living
a worthwhile life, beyond the unquieting experience of the moment.
Loss of flexible contact with the present is a consequence of the fusion and
avoidance consisting in becoming entangled in analysis of the past and the future. This
entanglement leads to one’s losing touch with the contingencies of the present moment.
If «rumination» over the past is associated with depression, worry about the future
would be associated with anxiety. In order to extricate onself from this entanglement,
ACT encourages the use of language more as a tool for becoming aware of and
describing private events than for predicting and judging them. In this regard, it is
common to use exercises of contemplation and mindfulness for putting into practice
different «modes of mind» that are less analytical, judgmental and controlling, and
conversely, more exploratory, open and flexible.
The concept of attachment to the conceptualized self refers to evaluative stories
have learned from the social-verbal context about who we are, in this case, a sort of
fusion with the self, without any kind of perspective or distance. Such attachment to
the self impedes the person from being in touch with a more transcendent sense of self.
In contrast to self-attachment, ACT promotes a certain self-distancing or perspective
with regard to the self, on distinguishing self-as-context – the observer self or transcendent
self – from self-as-content, comprising the different events one is continually experiencing.
Self-as-context is promoted in ACT through mindfulness exercises, metaphors, and
experiential processes. Thus, clients can be asked to imagine they are older or they look
like they did when they were younger, or to write a letter of advice to the person
(themself) who is now having the problems. In Spanish, the dual nature of the verb «to
be» (ser and estar) is of great utility for appreciating these dual aspects of self.
Problems with values concern their lack of clarification, being as they are in ACT
directions and horizons that give meaning to life. In ACT, «values are freely chosen,
verbally constructed consequences of ongoing, dynamic, evolving patterns of activity,
which establish predominant reinforcers for that activity that are intrinsic in engagement
in the valued behavioral pattern in itself» (Wilson, Sandoz, Kitchens, and Roberts, 2010,
p. 253).
Inaction, impulsivity or persistent avoidance are the consequence of the mentioned
processes and the quintessence of psychological inflexibility. In contrast to this is the
commitment to act in the direction of values, reflected in the name and the essence of
Acceptance and Commitment Therapy, to say «act.»
Psychological inflexibility, consisting in the mentioned processes, supplants and
impedes a worthwhile life, insofar as one is occupied with oneself, trying in vain to get
out of the situation due to the entrenched and inflexible patterns currently dominating
one’s life. In contrast, the clarification of values would give meaning – direction and
significance – to life, permitting and motivating one to move forward in spite of the
current experiences and suffering. Eventually, values would enable the person to ignore
the «symptoms,» going on to reduce and eliminate them. Hence, ACT does not directly
seek the removal of the symptoms (as in the medical model); rather, this is something
that may derive from greater psychological flexibility and a reorientation of life toward
one’s values, which is actually what is proposed in this therapy and in third-generation
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therapies in general. Values are more directions that guide one’s way (horizons) than
destinations that are reached (goals and targets). In practice, the clarification of values
is expressed in life domains that are important and consistent for the person, such as
family, marital and kinship relations, friendship and social relationships, work, education
and training, entertainment, spirituality, community or civic life, or physical well-being.
Table 3 summarizes the six psychopathological processes and the corresponding healthy
and therapeutic ones.
TABLE 3. Processes of psychological inflexibility and alternative healthy and
therapeutic processes.
Processes of psychological inflexibility  
 
 Alternative healthy and therapeutic processes 
(psychological flexibility) 
Cognitive fusion 
Experiential avoidance 
Dominance of the conceptualized past and 
feared future; weak self-knowledge 
Attachment to the conceptualized self 
Lack of values clarity 
Inaction, impulsivity, or avoidance persistence 
Defusion  
Acceptance 
Contact with the present moment 
 
Self as context 
Values clarification 
Committed action 
Clinical innovation: Cognitive disentanglement and behavioral activation as therapeutic
principles
The third-generation therapies represented by ACT and as outlined above are
characterized not by a collection of techniques, but by offering general therapeutic
principles. The key is in being clear about the goal of the psychotherapy, which in this
case is the promotion of psychological flexibility, not, for example, the reduction of
symptoms, which would be secondary, not due to lack of interest, but because it follows
from other changes. In terms of the contextual dimensions highlighted in the
characterization of these therapies, their objective is to change the context and function
of the «symptoms», not their content and form (topography and frequency). Thus, ACT
seeks to change the context of the self or relational framework within the person
experiencing the problematic events, so that even without changing such events there
is a radical change in their function, from fusion to self-distancing or from inflexibility
to flexibility. BA sets out to change the environment through operant behaviors in the
client that can open up new possibilities and contingencies, which may in turn, feed
back positively onto depressogenic thoughts and feelings. FAP creates an interpersonal
therapeutic context in which the client can have corrective experiences.
The six healthy and therapeutic processes corresponding to the different
psychopathological processes identified by ACT converge in two main principles referred
to in this therapy as mindfulness and acceptance processes, covering defusion, acceptance,
contact with the present moment and self as context, and commitment and behavior
change processes, which embrace commitment to action, values, self as context and
contact with the present moment, the last two being common to the two principles
(Hayes et al., 2006, 2011). In the words of Francisco Ruíz, «therapeutic work in ACT can
be summarized in two principles: 1) promoting values clarification and actions that are
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in accordance with such values; and 2) promoting defusion as a way to be involved
in the valued ends when the feared private events are present» (Ruiz, 2010, p. 128). In
more general terms, they could be called cognitive or self-reflexive disentanglement and
behavioral activation or re-orientation to life. Figure 1 shows the convergence.
Two general therapeutic principles
FIGURE 1. Convergence of different healthy processes in two general principles.
The notion of self-reflexive disentanglement implies that some kind of intensified
– and not just unproductive, but counterproductive – reflexivity is a pathogenic condition
common to the different diagnoses (Pérez-Álvarez, 2008). The fact that this disentanglement
implies acceptance suggests that life already, of itself, involves suffering and problems
that people must face, even though they may live in the «welfare society» and have
received the promise of technological solutions for everything, including those provided
by psychopharmacology and psychotherapy. The truth is that people must recover the
normal acceptance of the possiblity of suffering and distress. The paradox is that people
today need therapies that give them back the expropriated acceptance or, so to speak,
return them to reality (Freud’s «ordinary unhappiness»). And thank goodness that there
are therapies with the lucidity and means to do so, such as ACT and the other third-
generation therapies, not forgetting others, such as logotherapy or existential therapy
(Pérez-Álvarez, 2001).
For its part, the notion of reorientation to life assumes that the meaning of life,
whatever it be, is beyond the person, not within us; it is on a horizon, as obiously out
there as it is ever-elusive and beyond us (a question of values). Reorientation to life,
in therapy, is as important or more so than disentanglement (acceptance). It is not a
question simply of involvement in pleasurable activities, but rather one of activation
with meaning, oriented toward something meaningful (valued). If self-reflexive
disentanglement permits a reorientation of life toward valued or worthwhile things, one’s
own involvement in the world, beyond oneself, avoids self-entanglement, or at least
pushes it into the background. The more we are immersed in the world, the less we are
self-entangled, and the greater the self-entanglement, the less life there is.
Six core therapeutic and healthy processes  
Defusion   Acceptance Contact        Self-context      Values     Commitment 
 
 
 
    
Acceptance/Mindfulness 
Self-reflective disentanglement 
Commitment/Activation 
Orientation to life 
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According to Hayes et al. (2011), with regard to ACT in relation to cognitive
therapy, the important question is not to compare the empirical efficacy of packages of
techniques or brands of therapies, but rather to establish, and where appropriate to
compare, assumptions, theories and processes. Not microscopic processes, the typical
«mechanisms» (the word already suggests mechanicism) – which, moreover, could
entangle whole lifetimes of diligent researchers – but rather philosophically theoretically,
scientifically and clinically grounded principles, such as those already mentioned. As
far as we are concerned here, the most relevant philosophy for psychopathology and
psychological therapy probably lies somewhere between phenomenology and existentialism
(Pérez-Álvarez, 2012b).
Thus, more than from technical «tricks», change can come from the horizon of
meaning. The presence of a horizon of values can transform distressing experiences as
an inherent part of one’s life course which, otherwise, could easily give rise to an
experiential avoidance disorder, as demonstrated experimentally by Carmen Luciano’s
team (Luciano et al., 2010; Páez Blarrina et al., 2008). Thus, when distressing experiences
in experimental tasks (irritating noises) are framed in an ACT context or protocol they
become less annoying, unlike when they are framed in a protocol of avoidance, as tends
to occur in everyday life, governed by age-old wisdom according to which one must
«feel all right» before doing something, and indeed feel happy in order to move forward.
The acceptance-based protocol, compared to that based on avoidance, is very similar
to the practice of ACT, as well as to everyday situations, as indeed the ACT protocol
seeks to be, asking the client for similar examples from his or her life (Luciano, Molina
et al., 2010). The identification of such similarities makes this study relevant in relation
to FAP, a therapy which focuses particularly on establishing functional equivalence
between real life and the clinical situation. Likewise, the ACT protocol’s concern with
stressing to the client that «it is you who is hearing the sensation or feeling […] and
you choose to do nothing with that feeling» (Luciano, Molina et al., 2010, p. 102) is
also relevant for FAP, given its interest in developing private control of the self (Kohlenberg
and Tsai, 1991). Furthermore, the ACT protocol implies a philosophy for cultural change,
beginning by integrating distress as a part of valued behavior.
Challenges: Less mindfulness and more philosophy
As would be expected, the third-generation therapies face numerous challenges,
starting with those derived from their own success. Thus, they are at risk of becoming
a fashion to which many subscribe without the necessary preparation or training, given
that their logic and procedure are quite different from those already established in
academic, clinical and popular contexts. Much of the risk related to fashion is due to
the alliance between these therapies – particularly ACT – and mindfulness, which,
without wishing to belittle its relevance, lends itself to snobbery. While mindfulness can
offer valuable techniques and attitudes, beyond that it may not really contribute anything
relevant, and might even mislead, insofar as one’s strength is invested in this aspect
to the detriment of commitment to the world and to values. We have already stressed
the transformational power of a horizon of values in relation to one’s own experiences.
The roads of the Himalayas were not built with mindfulness. We should not overlook
Int J Clin Health Psychol, Vol. 12. Nº 2
304 PÉREZ-ÁLVAREZ. Third-Generation Therapies
the fact that those who practice mindfulness in the temples of Tibet appear to have little
interest in the starving children they meet on the way in (Begley, 2008, p. 22).
Another risk of success may reside in the «fetishism» of the techniques, depending
on the tastes of those who train in them, when what is actually relevant are the
philosophical, theoretical and practical principles, in that order, and in any event,
principles rather than techniques.
Apart from the challenges they face for distinguishing themselves from cognitive
therapy (Herbert and Forman, 2011; Hofmann, Asmundson, and Beck, 2011), and with
respect to particular concepts (Kämpfe et al., 2012), the greatest and most interesting
challenge for the third-generation therapies is to strengthen each other, given their
generational affinities, and to establish affinities with other therapeutic approaches.
Regarding the links between them, up to now there would seem to be more influence
of ACT on the rest, insofar as they have adopted the concept of acceptance, but there
has not been so much adoption in the other direction, despite the fact that ACT lacks
concepts which the others have especially developed, such as the self in the case of
FAP. Researchers on each therapy should check their own «psychological inflexibility»
and «fusion» with their theories. As regards the relationship with other traditions, some
have been identified, including the affinity between FAP and psychoanalytic
psychotherapy and between existential therapy and ACT (Pérez-Álvarez, 2001). The fact
of these similarities is evidence of the sound progress of third-generation therapies,
which should not remain unaffected by what is already known in the therapeutic
tradition. Sometimes, originality consists in having read little, as Freud acknowledged.
Other challenges concern philosophical bases of more solidity and with greater
scope. The third-generation therapies should be praised for the declaration of their
philosophical assumptions, and in particular because they are those of functional
contextualism, a type of psychological pragmatism with its origins in Skinner’s radical
behaviorism. With this in mind, and also for pragmatic reasons of asserting themselves
in the wide world of psychology and psychiatry, the philosophy of the third-generation
therapies, led by ACT, should be more ambitious and radical. Its simple psychological
pragmatism entails weaknesses of philosophical dimensions. Thus, ontological abstinence
(Hayes et al., 2011, p. 3) becomes a kind of philosophical vegetarianism which is
perceived, for example, in relation to the conception of values (Wilson et al., 2010),
which displays vulgar subjectivism and is dependent on choice as though it were a case
of selecting products in a supermarket (closely in step, incidentally, with economic
liberalism). If values have the importance they do it is because they are objective,
socially institutionalized, out-there in the world and even imposed, insofar as individuals
form part of a society that is already up and running. As though gangsters or anorexics,
for example, had no values and values give the same ones that other. Ontological
abstinence is also perceived in the failure to ask what psychological disorders are, about
their nature, beyond the «processes» involved («psychological inflexibility,» etc.). This
meta-empirical question is important if only for the «pragmatic» reason of having to
confront contrary positions, not least those of psychiatry.
As a philosophical remedy, the third-generation therapies could highlight their
affinities with the Western philosophical tradition. The slogan could be along the lines
of «less Buddhist mindfulness and more Western philosophy.» By way of an indication,
we might consider a couple of philosophical affinities with radical behaviorism, which
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is, after all, at the root of functional contextualism and of RFT. We are referring to
Aristotle and phenomenology. Although such references were not intended to remedy
the philosophical «diet» of the third-generation therapies, they could be of relevance
for them. In any case, the question is to situate psychological pragmatism in a broader
context. For example, the doctrine of Aristotle’s four causes applied to behavior permits
us to conceive a notion of organism and even of person which, on the one hand,
prevents us from falling into intrapersonal mechanicism, and on the other, roots all
behavior in the historical-cultural context (Pérez-Álvarez, 2009; Pérez-Álvarez and García-
Montes, 2006). Likewise, the application of the four causes to psychopathology allows
a radically contextual ontological approach to mental disorders (Pérez-Álvarez, 2004;
Pérez-Álvarez, Sass, and García-Montes, 2008).
For its part, the affinity of radical behaviorism with phenomenology and existentialism
permits an understanding of psychological disorders in the context of life problems,
which is how they should be understood (García-Montes and Pérez-Álvarez, 2010).
Thus, for example, in the broader context of phenomenology, functional contextualism
may confront problems such as schizophrenia. ACT handles itself well in the area of
«neurotic» disorders, as do, in general, the rest of the psychological therapies, but it
goes nowhere in relation to schizophrenia, where the concept of «psychological
inflexibility» itself is overwhelmed. Staying on the subject of schizophrenia, the
«psychological flexibility» in that disorder may be an aspect that is more
psychopathological, characteristic of the condition, than healthy. If the third-generation
therapies are clinical innovations that go beyond fashion, we can also expect
«groundbreaking» conceptions in disorders such as schizophrenia, as long as we seek
to consider it as a disorder of the self rather than of the brain (Pérez-Álvarez, 2012a).
Notes for an extension of ACT to schizophrenia
Various case studies (García-Montes, Luciano, Hernández, and Zaldivar, 2004; García-
Montes and Pérez-Álvarez, 2001, 2010; Veiga-Martínez, Pérez-Álvarez, and García-Mon-
tes, 2008) and clinical trials (Bach and Hayes, 2002; Gaudiano and Herbert, 2006;
Shawyer et al., 2012; White et al., 2011) have shown the feasibility and usefulness of
ACT for the relief of psychotic symptoms, including the reduction of hospital readmissions
within one year of follow-up (Bach, Hayes, and Gallop, 2012). While acknowledging the
merit of this, it must be said that the results are somewhat modest. Althoug the lower
rehospitalization rate in those receiving ACT might make for a striking headline along
the lines of «brief psychotherapy technique keeps psychotic patients out of hospital»,
the patient’s status does not change (Bach et al., 2011).
The modesty of these results may be due in large part to the role ACT seems to
have accepted in schizophrenia, like the other psychological therapies, as adjuncts to
medication, within the dominant biomedical model. The point is that ACT, in the context
of the third-generation therapies, has more to offer in schizophrenia, beginning by
criticizing and challenging the biomedical model, given that its own model is a contextual
one. Its potential contributions come up against the accepted conceptions and practices,
and are limited by them. Thus, its shifting of the focus from the reduction of symptoms
to changing the way patients respond to them, and to leaving behind the «illness» label,
collides with established clinical conventions, including the indoctrination of people in
the medical model. It is true that today it is difficult to find any patients not on
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medication to whom to apply psychological therapy, but it is also true that patients
could eschew medication: this is more an instititional question than a scientific one
(Pérez-Álvarez and García-Montes, 2012).
In any case, given the circumstances, ACT should undoubtedly overcome its own
«doctrinal inflexibility» to be in a position to deal with schizophrenia. Let us consider
some potentially worthwhile ways forward.
ACT should recognize that other therapies also use the concept of acceptance, and
with notable success, prestige and coverage. These would include the «accepting» and
«making sense of» voices approach developed by Marius Romme and Sandra Escher
(Romme and Escher, 1993, 2000). Two aspects of this approach could be of interest to
ACT. One is related to «making sense» of the voices in the biographical context, which
might be more acceptable and pragmatic for some patients than not going into the
content of the voices, as advocated by ACT. Another concerns that fact that given its
naturalistic conception of what people do with the voices, Romme and Escher’s approach
emphasizes strategies which in some cases might be more viable than quasi-psychotic
ACT procedures such as «taking the mind for a walk,» seeing thoughts as «thoughts,»
materialized without meaning, or deliteralizing words – practices in which many
schizophrenic patients are already «experts.»
Acceptance of the symptoms must also apply to other clinicians with whom the
patient is dealing, and to their families. Non-acceptance of the symptoms by others in
the clinical team, especially psychiatrists, is at the root of backsliding in patients who
were being treated with ACT (García-Montes and Pérez-Álvarez, 2001). In contrast, it has
been shown that closer collaboration between clinicians helped the patient’s course,
including the reduction of medication (Veiga-Martínez et al., 2008). On the other hand,
there are plenty of reports of patients successfully treated with ACT without being on
medication (García-Montes and Pérez-Álvarez, 2010). Acceptance by family members is
also crucial in the ACT perspective. Clinicians and family should be trained in the ACT
philosophy, rather than in the theory of vulnerability-stress. The better prognosis of
schizophrenia in less developed countries, compared to more developed ones, has to
do with the greater acceptance of «psychotic crises» (Pérez-Álvarez, 2012a). As we have
mentioned, ACT has implications for cultural change (Luciano, Molina et al., 2010).
Given that the therapeutic relationship is a fundamental aspect of psychotherapy
for schizophrenia, in the sense that the interpersonal chemistry is more important than
the interneuronal chemistry (Pérez-Álvarez and Garcia-Montes, 2012a; Pérez-Álvarez,
García-Montes, Vallina-Fernández, Perona-Garcelán, and Cuevas Yust, 2011), the therapeutic
relationship in ACT can be improved on the basis of FAP (Baruch, Kanter, Busch, and
Juskiewicz, 2009). Thus, the interpersonal context can provide opportunities for the
recovery of sense of self as proposed by FAP (Kohlenberg and Tsai, 1991). The
recovery of sense of self in the therapeutic context may include the development of a
narrative that frames experiences and values (Pérez-Álvarez et al., 2011). Just as an ACT
protocol transforms pain experiences (Luciano, Molina et al., 2010), there is no reason
why it should not do the same in relation to psychotic experiences. ACT can also benefit
from the BA strategies developed for treating depression, in this case for negative
psychotic symptoms, with a view to facilitating access to reinforcement contingencies
(Mairs, Lowell, Campbell, and Keeley, 2011).
Taking into account all of these suggestions, the contextual, de-medicalizing
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philosophy of ACT can confront schizophrenia, going beyond the ancillary role and the
modest results which have been its fate up to now. As in the case of schizophrenia,
recovery does not take place without transformations.
Referencias
Bach, P.A. and Hayes, S.C. (2002). The use of acceptance and commitment therapy to prevent
the rehospitalization of psychotic patients: A randomized controlled trial. Journal of
Consulting and Clinical Psychology, 70, 1129-1139.
Bach, P., Hayes, S.C., and Gallop, R. (2012). Long-term effects of brief Acceptance and
Commitment Therapy for Psychosis. Behavior Modification, 36, 165-181.
Barnes-Holmes, D. (2005). La teoría de los marcos relacionales y el análisis experimental del
lenguaje y la cognición. Revista Latinoamericana de Psicologia, 37, 255-275.
Barraca, J. (2009). La activación conductual (AC) y la terapia de activación conductual para la
depresión (TACD). Dos protocololos de tratamiento desde la activación conductual.
EduPsykhé, 8, 23-50.
Barraca, J. (2012). «Mental control» from a third-wave behavior therapy perspective. International
Journal of Clinical and Health Psychology 12, 109-121.
Barraca, J., Pérez-Álvarez, M., and Lozano Bleda, J.H. (2011). Avoidance and activation as keys
to depression: Adaptation of the Behavioral Activation for Depression Scale in a Spanish
sample. Spanish Journal of Psychology, 14, 998-1009.
Baruch, D.E., Kanter, J.W., Busch, A.M., and Juskiewicz, K.L. (2009). Enhancing the Therapy
Relationship in Acceptance and Commitment Therapy for psychotic symptoms. Clinical
Case Studies, 8, 241-257.
Begley, S. (2008). Entrena tu mente, cambia tu cerebro. Barcelona: Granica.
Bishop, M., Lau, S., Shapiro, L., Carlson, N.D., Anderson, J., Carmody, J., Segal, Z. V., Abbey,
S., Speca, M., Velting, D., and Devins, G. (2004). Mindfulness: A proposed operational
definition. Clinical Psychology: Science and Practice, 11, 230–241.
Canguilhem, G. (1966/1971). Lo normal y lo patológico. Buenos Aires: Siglo XXI.
Christensen, A. and Jacobson, N. (1998). Acceptance and change in couple therapy: A therapist’s
guide to transforming relationships. New York: Norton.
Dimidjian, S., Hollon, S.D., Dobson, K.S., Schmaling, K.B., Kohlenberg, R., Addis, M., Gallop,
R., McGlinchey, J.B, Markley, D.K, Gollan, J.K., Atkins, D.C, Dunner, D.L, and
Jacobson, N.S. (2006). Randomized trial of behavioral activation, cognitive therapy, and
antidepressant medication in the acute treatment of adults with major depression. Journal
of Consulting and Clinical Psychology, 74, 658-670.
Dougher, M. (2011). Clinical Behavior Analysis. Reno: Context Press.
Fernández-Ríos, L. and Buela-Casal, G. (2009). Standards for the preparation and writing of
Psychology review articles. International Journal of Clinical and Health Psychology, 9,
329-344.
García-Montes, J.M., Luciano, C., Hernández, M., and Zaldívar, F. (2004). Aplicación de la
Terapia de Aceptación y Compromiso a sintomatología delirante. Un estudio de caso.
Psicothema, 16, 117-124.
García-Montes J.M. and Pérez-Álvarez, M. (2001). ACT como tratamiento de los síntomas
psicóticos. El caso de las alucinaciones auditivas. Análisis y Modificación de Conducta,
27, 455-472.
García-Montes, J.M. and Pérez-Álvarez, M. (2005). Fundamentación experimental y primeras
aplicaciones clínicas de la Terapia de Aceptación y Compromiso (ACT) en el campo de
los síntomas psicóticos. Revista Latinoamericana de Psicología, 37, 379-393.
Int J Clin Health Psychol, Vol. 12. Nº 2
308 PÉREZ-ÁLVAREZ. Third-Generation Therapies
García-Montes, J.M. and Pérez-Álvarez, M. (2010). Exposition in existential terms of a case of
«Negative Schizophrenia» approached by means of Acceptance and Commitment Therapy.
International Journal of Existential Psychology and Psychotherapy, 3, 1-18.
García Palacios, A. (2006). La terapia dialéctico-comportamental. EduPsykhé, 5, 255-272.
Gaudiano, B.A. and Herbert, J.D. (2006). Acute treatment of inpatients with psychotic symptoms
using acceptance and commitment therapy: Pilot results. Behaviour Research and Therapy,
44, 415-437.
Hartley, J. (2012). New ways of making academic articles easier to read. International Journal
of Clinical and Health Psychology, 12, 143-160.
Harvey, A., Watkins, E., Mansell, W., and Shafran, R. (2008). Cognitive behavioural processes
across psychological disorders. A transdiagnostic approach to research and treatment.
Oxford: Oxford University Press.
Hayes, S.C. (2004). Acceptance and commitment therapy, relational frame theory, and third wave
of behavioral and cognitive therapies. Behavior Therapy, 35, 639-665.
Hayes, S.C., Barnes-Holmes, D., and Roche, B. (Eds.) (2001). Relational Frame Theory: A Post-
Skinnerian account of human language and cognition. New York: Plenum Press.
Hayes, S.C., Levin, M.E., Plumb-Vilardaga, J., Villatte, J.L., and Pistorello, J. (2011). Acceptance
and commitment therapy and contextual behavioral science: Examining the progress of
distintive model of behavioral and cognitive therapy. Behavior Therapy, 10.1016/
j.beth.2009.08.002
Hayes, S.C., Luoma, J., Bond, F., Masuda, A., and Lillis, J. (2006). Acceptance and Commitment
Therapy: Model, processes, and outcomes. Behaviour Research and Therapy, 44, 1–25.
Hayes, S.C., Strosahl, K.D., and Wilson, K.G. (1999). Acceptance and Commitment Therapy. An
Experiential Approach to Behavior Change. New York: The Guilford Press.
Hayes, S.C., Wilson, K.W., Gifford, E.V., Follette, V.M., and Strosahl, K. (1996). Experiential
avoidance and behavioral disorders: A functional dimensional approach to diagnosis and
treatment. Journal of Consulting and Clinical Psychology, 64, 1152-1168.
Herbert, J.D. and Forman, E.M. (2011). Caution: The differences between CT and ACT may
be larger (and Ssaller) than they appear. Behavior Therapy, 10.1016/j.beth.2009.09.005
Hofmann, S.G., Asmundson, G.J., and Beck, A.T. (2011). The Science of Cognitive-Behavioral
Therapy. Behavior Therapy, 10.1016/j.beth.2009.01.007
Hofmann, S.G., Sawyer, A.T., Witt, A.A., and Oh, D. (2010). The effect of mindfulness-based
therapy on anxiety and depression: A meta-analytic review. Journal of Consulting and
Clinical Psychology, 78, 169–183.
Ingram, R.E. (1990). Self-focus attention in clinical disorders: Review and a conceptual model.
Psychological Bulletin, 107, 156-172.
Jacobson, N.S., Christensen, A., Prince, S.E., Cordova, J., and Eldridge, K. (2000). Integrative
Behavioral Couple Therapy. An acceptance-based, promising new treatment for couple
discord. Journal of Consulting and Clinical Psychology, 68, 351-355.
Jacobson, N.S., Dobson, K.S., Truax, P.A., Addis, M.E., Koerner, K., Gollan, J.K., Gortner, E.,
and Prince, S.E. (1996). A component analysis of cognitive-behavioral treatment for
depression. Journal of Consulting and Clinical Psychology, 64, 295–304.
Jacobson, N.S., Martell, C.R., and Dimidjian, S. (2001). Behavioral activation treatment for
depression: Returning to contextual roots. Clinical Psychology: Science and Practice, 8,
255–270.
Kämpfe, C.K., Gloster, A.T., Wittchen, H.-U., Helbig-Lang, S., Lang, T. Gerlach, A.L., Richter,
J., Alpers, G.W., Fehm, L., Kircher, T., Hamm, A.O, Ströhle, A., and Deckert, J. (2012).
Experiential avoidance and anxiety sensitivity in patients with panic disorder and agoraphobia:
Do both constructs measure the same? International Journal of Clinical and Health
Psychology, 12, 5-22.
Int J Clin Health Psychol, Vol. 12. Nº 2
PÉREZ-ÁLVAREZ. Third-Generation Therapies 309
Keng, S.-L., Smoski, M.J., and Robins, C.J. (2011). Effects of mindfulness on psychological
health: A review of empirical studies. Clinical Psychology Review, 31, 1041–1056.
Kohlenberg, R.J. and Tsai, M. (1991). Functional analytic psychotherapy: A guide for creating
intense and curative therapeutic relationships. New York: Plenum.
Kohlenberg, R.J., Tsai, M., Ferro-García, R., Valero-Aguayo, L., Fernández-Parra, A., and Virués-
Ortega, J. (2005). Psicoterapia Analítico-Funcional y Terapia de Aceptación y Compro-
miso: teoría, aplicaciones y continuidad con el análisis del comportamiento. International
Journal of Clinical and Health Psychology, 5, 349-371.
Linehan, M.M. (1993). Cognitive-behavioral treatment of borderline personality disorder. New
York: The Guilford Press.
Luciano, C. and Hayes, S. (2001). Trastorno de evitación experiencial. International Journal of
Clinical and Health Psychology, 1, 109-157.
Luciano, C., Molina, F., Gutiérrez-Martínez, O., Barnes-Holmes, D., Valdivia-Salas, S., Cabello,
F., Barnes-Holmes, I., Rodríguez-Valverde, M., and Wilson. K.G. (2010). The impact of
acceptance-based versus avoidance-based protocols on discomfort. Behavior Modification,
34, 94-119.
Luciano, C., Páez-Blarrina, M., and Valdivia-Salas, S. (2010). La Terapia de Aceptación y
Compromiso (ACT) en el consumo de sustancias como estrategia de evitación experiencial.
International Journal of Clinical and Health Psychology, 10, 141-165.
Mairs, H., Lovell, K., Campbell, M., and Keeley, P. (2011). Development and pilot investigation
of behavioral activation for negative symptoms. Behavior Modification, 35, 486–506.
Martell, C.R., Addis, M.E., and Jacobson, N. (2001). Depression in context: Strategies for guided
action. New York: Norton.
Martín-Murcia, F., Cangas Díaz, A., and Pardo Gonzalez, L. (2011). A case study of anorexia
nervosa and obsessive personality disorder using third-generation behavioral therapies.
Clinical Case Studies, 10, 198-209.
Páez-Blarrina, M., Luciano, C., Gutiérrez-Martínez, O., Valdivia, S., Ortega, J., and Rodríguez-
Valverde, M. (2008). The role of values with personal examples in altering the functions
of pain: Comparison between acceptance-based and cognitive-control-based protocols.
Behaviour Research and Therapy, 46, 84-97.
Pérez Álvarez, M. (1996). La psicoterapia desde el punto de vista conductista. Madrid: Biblio-
teca Nueva.
Pérez Álvarez, M. (2001). Afinidades entre las nuevas terapias de conducta y las terapias
tradicionales con otras orientaciones. International Journal of Clinical and Health Psychology
1, 15-33.
Pérez-Álvarez, M. (2004). Psychopathology according to behaviorism: A radical restatement.
Spanish Journal of Psychology, 7, 171-177.
Pérez-Álvarez, M. (2006). La terapia de conducta de tercera generación. EduPsykhé, 5, 159-172.
Pérez Álvarez, M. (2007). La activación conductual y la desmedicalización de la depresión.
Papeles del Psicólogo, 28, 97-110.
Pérez-Álvarez, M. (2008). Hyperreflexivity as condition in mental disorders: A clinical and
historical perspective. Psicothema, 20, 181-187.
Pérez-Álvarez, M. (2009). The four causes of behavior: Aristotle and Skinner. International
Journal of Psychology and Psychological Therapy, 9, 45-57.
Pérez-Álvarez, M. (2012a). Esquizofrenia y cultura moderna: razones de la locura. Psicothema,
24, 1-9.
Pérez-Álvarez, M. (2012b). Las raíces de la psicopatología moderna. La melancolía y la
esquizofrenia. Madrid: Pirámide.
Pérez-Álvarez, M. and García-Montes, J.M. (2006). Person, behaviour and contingencies (an
aesthetic view of behaviourism). International Journal of Psychology, 41, 449-461.
Int J Clin Health Psychol, Vol. 12. Nº 2
310 PÉREZ-ÁLVAREZ. Third-Generation Therapies
Pérez-Álvarez, M. and García-Montes, J.M. (2012). From neurochemistry to interpersonal
chemistry: Towards a psychotherapy of schizophrenia. En A. J. Lancaster and O. Sharpe
(Eds.), Psychotherapy: New research. New York: Nova Science Publishers.
Pérez-Álvarez, M., García-Montes, J.M., Vallina-Fernández, O., Perona-Garcelán, S., and Cue-
vas-Yust, C. (2011). New life for psychotherapy in the light of phenomenology. Clinical
Psychology and Psychotherapy, 18, 187-201.
Pérez Álvarez, M. and Sass, L. (2008). Phenomenology and behaviourism: A mutual readjustment.
Philosophy, Psychiatry and Psychology, 15, 199-210.
Pérez Álvarez, M., Sass, L., and García Montes, J.M. (2008). More Aristotle, Less DSM: The
ontology of mental disorders in constructivist perspective. Philosophy, Psychiatry and
Psychology, 15, 211-225.
Romme, M. and Escher, S. (1993). Accepting voices. London: Mind.
Romme, M. and Escher, S. (2000). Making sense of voices. London: Mind.
Ruiz, F.J. (2010). A review of Acceptance and Commitment Therapy (ACT) empirical evidence:
Correlational, experimental Ppychopathology, component and outcome studies. International
Journal of Psychology and Psychological Therapy, 10, 125-162.
Ruiz, F. J. and Luciano, C. (2009). Eficacia de la terapia de aceptación y compromiso (ACT)
en la mejora del rendimiento ajedrecístico de jóvenes promesas. Psicothema, 21, 347-352.
Segal, Z. V., Williams, M. G., and Teasdale, J. D. (2002). Mindfulness-based cognitive therapy
for depression: A new approach to preventing relapse. New York; Guilford Press.
Shawyer, F., Farhall, J., Mackinnon, A., Trauer, T., Sims, E., Ratcliff, K, Larner, C., Thomas,
N., Castle, D., Mullen, P., and Copolov D. (2012). A randomised controlled trial of
acceptance-based cognitive behavioural therapy for command hallucinations in psychotic
disorders. Behaviour Research Therapy, 50,110-121.
Soler, J., Valdepérez, A., Feliu-Soler, A., Pascual, J. C., Portella, M. J., Martín-Blanco, A.,
Alvarez, E., and Pérez, V. (2012). Effects of the dialectical behavioral therapy-mindfulness
module on attention in patients with borderline personality disorder. Behaviour Research
and Therapy, 50, 150-157.
Valero-Aguayo, L., Kohlenberg, R., Ferro-García, R., and Tsai, M. (2011). Therapeutic change
processes in Functional Analytic Psychotherapy. Clínica y Salud, 22, 209-221.
Veiga-Martínez C., Pérez-Álvarez M., and García-Montes J.M. (2008). Acceptance and commitment
therapy applied to treatment of auditory hallucinations. Clinical Case Studies, 2, 118-
135.
Wampold, B.E. (2001). The great psychotherapy debate: Models, methods, and findings. Mahwah:
Lawrence Erlbaum Associates Pub.
Weeks, C.E., Kanter, J.W., Bonow, J.T., Landes, S.J., and Busch, A.M. (2012). Translating the
theoretical into practical: A logical framework of Functional Analytic Psychotherapy
interactions for research, training and clinical purposes. Behavior Modification, 36, 87-
119.
White, R.G., Gumley, A.I., McTaggart, J., Rattrie, L., McConville, D., Cleare, S., and Mitchell,
G. (2011). A feasibility study of Acceptance and Commitment Therapy for emotional
dysfunction following psychosis. Behaviour Research and Therapy, 49, 901-907.
Wilson, B.E. and Luciano, M.C. (2002). Terapia de aceptación y compromiso (ACT). Un
tratamiento conductual orientado a valores. Pirámide.
Wilson, K., Sandoz, E.K., Kitchens, J., and Roberts, M. (2010). The Valued Living Questionnaire:
Defining and measuring valued action within a behavioral framework. Psychological
Record, 60, 249–272.
Received March 7, 2012
Accepted April 2, 2012
